

Gay Science

1. (B) The need for “more than just a *single* preface,” and an emphasis on the *experiences* of this book. “Gay science” refers to one who “withstood a terribly long oppression” with no hope, but now has hope and hope for health. He has had a “disdain for humanity,” and suffered a “*nausea* that had grown out of ... romanticism.” He has grown “unhealthily clear-sighted ... [limited] to what is bitter, sharp, and hurtful in knowledge.”

2. For a person, it is either one’s defects or one’s strengths that leads them to philosophize. The result is either a need to philosophize or a luxury. The former is the more typical. We can ask “what will become of the thought itself that is brought forth under the *pressure* of sickness?”

Nietzsche is critical of many philosophical systems as “an interpretation of the body” and more pointedly “*a misunderstanding of the body.*” He is looking for a philosophical *physician* who can state and support the claim “all philosophizing up to now has was not about “truth,” but about something else, let us say about health, future, growth, power, life.”

3/4. A definition of a philosopher ...

1. Humans are busy at a single task: “doing what serves the preservation of the human species ... this instinct is in fact *the essence* of our type and herd.” He goes on to claim that when this “has incorporated itself into humanity,” it is an “ultimate liberation and irresponsibility [and] ... maybe there will be only ‘gay science’ then”

(B) He speaks of Life as “that drive that holds sway in the highest as much as in the commonest human beings, the drive to preserve the species ... “ is such that “at its ground, it is drive, instinct, foolishness, groundlessness”.

At the end of this aphorism, he begins to speak critically of this, “Human beings have gradually become fantastic animals who have to satisfy one more precondition of existence than any other animals do: human beings *have* to believe from time to time, to know, *why* they exist ...”

[So, what do you think, is Nietzsche a evolutionary biologist, as suggested in the first part, or is his also critical of this view, as is suggested in the second part?]

54. (B), (C) Appearance, for Nietzsche, is “what is itself at work and alive.” He speaks skeptically: “all knowledge is and will be, perhaps, the highest means of *maintaining* the universality of the dreaming ...”

57. (C) “Remove the phantasm and all the human *contribution* from them, you sober ones! Aye, if you could do *that!* If you could forget your heritage, your past, your prior training – your entire humanity and animality! For us there is no ‘reality’...”

58. (D) "Only as creators can we destroy! But we also should not forget this: creating new names and assessments and apparent truths is eventually enough to create new "things."

108. (D) Even if God/Buddha is dead, a shadow remains.

109. (A) We should beware of thinking of the world as a living thing or as having any kind of order, because "the overall character of the world is, for all eternity, chaos..." He also claims that there are no "laws in nature. There are only necessities." His goal is to "naturalize humanity through the pure, newly ground, newly redeemed nature..."

110. (A), (C) There are many errors in how we think about the world and also about our own selves: there are things, bodies, substances, enduring things, identical things, a thing is what it appears to be, our will is free, what is good for me is good in itself, impersonality and changeless duration of the self, reason as a free activity originating in itself (and independent of our drives).

After these errors arose, others tried to deny them, then the issue of truth arose and the previous errors became "the norms according to which one established the 'true' and 'untrue' ...Thus, the strength of knowledge does not lie in its degree of truth, but in its age, its embodiment, its character as a condition of life ... finally, knowing and striving for truth took their place as needs among the other needs." Now, Nietzsche claims "... the first attempt is being made to answer this question by experiment. How far does truth tolerate embodiment?"

111. (A), (B) The source or foundation of logic is in treating the similar as the same. This led to the concept of substance that "strictly speaking ... corresponds to nothing – for a long time the changing aspects of things had to go unseen, unperceived." The flow of logical thought "reflects the process of a battle among drives which by themselves are each very illogical and unfair."

112. (C) Nietzsche wishes to claim that causal explanation is not possible because "we first make everything into an *image*..." in this sense, science is the most faithful humanization of things that is possible ..."

(A) Nietzsche claims that "In truth, a continuum stands before us from which we isolate a couple of pieces, just as we always perceive a motion only as isolated points – that is we really do not see it, but infer it ... an intellect that saw the flux of events, would throw aside the concept of cause and effect and deny all determination."

113. (B) We are a collection of drives and may evolve into something different in terms of our drives.

116. (D) Moralities consist in an assessment and ranking of drive and actions by communities, call these herd instincts and they express the needs of the herd.

117. (D) Historically, the first pang of conscience for human beings was to be a member of a group. "To be oneself," or to possess "free will" was contrary to conscience. Now, it is the reverse.

118. (B) This is an example of Nietzsche's "deconstruction" of a notion. For good will, he looks at the psychological processes which comprise it: a balance of the drive to appropriate and the drive to submit.

119. (B) Altruism is basically the drive to submit.

120. (B) "... there is no health in itself, and all attempts to define such a thing have failed lamentably. It all depends on your aim, your horizon, your strengths, your inclinations, your errors, and especially on the ideals and phantasms of your soul ... Hence, there are countless healths of the body."

121. (A), (C) Without postulating bodies, planes, lines, planes causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content, "nobody could stand to live now!" In this sense, they are conditions of life. But they are also articles of faith (elsewhere he calls them false). But this purported argument "if x is a condition of life, then x is true," is false. A condition of life could be an error.

122. (D) Christianity "destroyed in every individual human being the belief in one's 'virtues.'" It also made us discount great "virtuous" figures in history, but the same attitude leads us to moral skepticism with regard to "all *religious* conditions and processes." However, we now need to "preserve their image and their type for the sake of knowledge." [Why do you think Nietzsche adds this last point?]

124. (D) We have left land (all errors and moralities), the possibilities for us are "infinite, and ... there is nothing more terrifying than infinity." Now "there is no longer any 'land'!"

125. (D) Madman speech: God is dead and we've killed him. Also, "this colossal event is still on its way and wandering."

270. (B), (D) Conscience: "You shall become who you are."

276. (A), (D) "... what thought shall be for me the ground, guarantee and sweetness of all further life!" This is to "... see as beautiful what is necessary in things ... I will be one of those who make things beautiful ... love of fate ... I want to be only a Yes-sayer!"

283. (B), (D) *Preparatory human beings*. "... an age that will bring heroism into knowledge and *wage wars* for the sake of thoughts and their consequences." These are "... human beings who have an inner penchant for seeking in all things what is *to be overcome* in them..." What follows is a description of "happier human beings" which he sums up as "*to live dangerously!* ... Live at war with your fellows and yourselves!"

289. (D) He speaks of "a total philosophical justification of one's way of living and thinking ..."

290. (B), (D) *One thing is needful*. 'Giving style' to one's character..." Furthermore, "... it was the compulsion of a single taste that was ruling and forming, in things both great and small.

Whether the taste was a good or bad one means less than one thinks – it is enough that it is *one* taste!”

335. (A), (B), (D) Physics. One moral act is the result of three distinct actions: one of these is the voice of the conscience, the second that of the will, and finally the external action. The voice/act of one’s conscience “has a prehistory in your drives, inclinations, disinclinations, experiences, and lack of experience.” Nietzsche believes that this kind of “... insight into *how, in each case, moral judgments have arisen to begin with* would spoil these lofty words for you... “ This is another example of Nietzsche’s “deconstruction” of morality. A Kantian golden rule type ethic is inconsistent with “five steps in self-knowledge.” The key point is that “identical acts neither exist nor can exist [because] ... every action that has been done, was done in a completely unique and irretrievable way, and that the same will hold of every future action.” The conclusion is “Let us *confine* ourselves, then, to purifying our opinions and valuations, and to *creating our own new tables of goods* – but we no longer want to brood over the ‘moral value of our actions!’” He also claims that in order to do this “... we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world; we must be *physicists* so that we can be *creators* in this sense.”

341. (D) The heaviest weight.

342. (D) Zarathustra.

343. (D) *What our cheerfulness means*. “The greatest recent event – that “God is dead,” the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable - ... our entire European morality [was built on it] ... its consequences for *us*, are ... a new kind of light that is hard to describe, a new kind of happiness, alleviation, cheering, encouragement, and dawn ... *our* seas lies open there again; maybe there was never before such an ‘open sea’.”

344. (A), (C), (D) *To what extent even we are still pious*. “... science rests on a faith ... *truth* is needed. Nietzsche challenges this as follows: “What do you know in advance about the character of existence in order to be able to determine whether the greater advantage lies on the side of the unconditionally mistrustful or the unconditionally trusting?” His point is that we don’t know enough to prefer the latter which is the will to truth. His conclusion is that “There is no doubt that truthful people, in the extreme and ultimate sense required by the faith on science, *affirm with this faith another world* than that of life, nature, and history.”

Nietzsche then also adheres to a “*metaphysical faith* ... we knowers of today, we godless ones and anti-metaphysicians, still take *our* fire from the flame first lit by a faith thousands of years old... that truth is divine.”

345. (D) *Morality as a problem*. Nietzsche wishes to “deconstruct” morality by looking at it as a “a history of the development of these feelings and valuations (which is something different from critique of them and still different from the history of ethical systems).” Nietzsche claims that the problem with moral philosophy is that it is an attempt to “... discover and criticize the

perhaps foolish opinions of a people about its morality ... But the value of the command, 'you shall,' is fundamentally different from and independent of these sorts of opinions about it ... no one up to now has tested the *value* of ... morality."

346. (A), (D) *Our question mark*. Nietzsche identifies with people who call "ourselves godless, or faithless, or even immoralists ... [because] we know well that the world in which we live is ungodly, immoral, 'inhuman'..." He then claims that there arises "... an opposition between the world in which we were at home until now with our reverences ... and another world *which we ourselves are?*" The consequence seems to be to "Either do away with your reverences, or *with yourselves!*" He claims that the latter is nihilism, but asks if the former is as well.

347. (B), (D) Will and faith are characterized as opposites: in one sense, faith is the desire to be commanded and will is the desire to command. Nietzsche's "ideal" is "a pleasure and strength in self-determination, a freedom of the will in which a spirit takes its leave of every faith ... the *free spirit par excellence.*"

348/349. (A), (B) Nietzsche is critical of scholars as wishing to prove something. He claims that the desire to "...preserve oneself expresses ... a constriction of the real, fundamental drive of life, which aims at *extending its power ...*" and thereby questioning and even sacrificing self-preservation. He concludes "... in nature what rules is ... overflow, superfluity, even to the point of absurdity ... supremacy, ... growth and expansion, ... the will to power which is precisely the will of life."

353. (D) The origin of religion is a recognition of a commonality among people and an attempt to elevate it.

354. (A), (C) The problem of consciousness. Nietzsche explicitly appeals to the "physiology and the history of animals" to suggest that we "think, feel, will, remember – we could otherwise 'act' in every sense of the word – and nevertheless, none of this would have to 'enter our consciousness' ..." Nietzsche goes on to speculate that "*consciousness in general has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication.*" He continues that "... human beings, like every living creature, are thinking constantly but do not know it. The thinking that becomes *conscious* is only the smallest part of thought, and we say it is the most superficial ...". He concludes: "My thought is, as you see, that consciousness does not really belong to the individual existence of human beings, but rather to the social and herd nature in them ... consequently each of us, despite the best will to understand oneself as individually as possible, 'to know oneself,' will always just bring to one's consciousness precisely what is not individual in one, what is 'average,' that our very thinking constantly *follows majority rule*, so to speak, ...". Since "All of our actions are at bottom incomparably personal unique, boundlessly individual, ... This is genuine phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand it ...". A consequence of this is that "... we do not even have any organ at all for *knowing*, for 'truth;' we 'know' (or imagine or believe) exactly as much as may be *useful* in the interest of the human herd, the species."

355. (C) *The origin of our concept of 'knowledge.'* Nietzsche claims that "What do the people understand by knowledge? What do they want when they want 'knowledge?' Nothing but this: something strange should be explained in terms of something *familiar*." He goes on to critique the epistemological tradition since Descartes as follows: "... they make it a rule of method to begin with the 'internal world,' with the 'facts of consciousness,' because this is the world that is *more familiar to us*? Error of errors! The familiar is what we are used to – and what we are used to is what is hardest to 'know,' that is to see it as a problem ... "

356. (D) *How things will get more and more 'artistic' in Europe.* As most male Europeans choose a role or profession, they tend to "confuse themselves with their role when they reach a more advanced age" because "... they themselves have forgotten to what extent chance, moods, and whims controlled them when their 'profession' was decided – and how many other roles they perhaps *could* have played ... the role really has *become* character; and art, nature. For the ancient Greeks, "... Individuals are convinced they can do practically anything, *can handle practically any role*, they all experiment with themselves, improvise, experiment again, take pleasure in experimenting; all nature ceases and becomes art."

Nietzsche fears that Europe is on the same path as the Greeks, such that "... there always emerge the most interesting and craziest ages of history, in which the 'actors,' *all* sorts of actors, are the real masters." This is contrary to a view of "... that human beings have value, have meaning, only in so far as they are stones in a great construction ...". For Nietzsche, "*None of us is material for a society anymore* – there's a truth that is timely!" He calls the "free society" of the socialism a contradiction in terms!

370. (D) *What is romanticism?* "Every art, every philosophy, may be seen as a means of health and assistance in the service of growing, struggling life; they always presuppose suffering and sufferers." One can sufferer from over-fullness or impoverishment of life. To the latter "... corresponds all romanticism in arts and knowledge ...". Continuing, "... those who suffer the most and are the poorest in life would most need mildness, peacefulness, kindness in thought and action, and, if possible, a god that is really a god for the sick, a 'savior.' ... Thus I gradually learned to comprehend Epicurus ... and likewise the 'Christian' [as] essentially romantic."

373. (A), (C) *"Science" as a prejudice.* "... what is most superficial and external in existence – its most apparent aspect, its skin and its sensory side – [lets] itself be grasped first? Maybe the *only* think that let itself be grasped? A 'scientific' interpretation of the world, as you understand it, could consequently still be one of the *stupidest*, that is, poorest in meaning, of all possible interpretations of the world ..."

374. (A), (C) Whether existence is perspectival "cannot be figured out ... since in this analysis the human intellect cannot help seeing itself under its own perspectival forms, and *only* in them. As a result, "we cannot exclude the possibility that [the world] *contains infinite interpretations*."

375. (D) Nietzsche prescribes "... a nearly Epicurean craving for knowledge which does not want to let the questionable character of things get by it easily... that is what constitutes *our* pride ... this self-control of the rider in his wildest riding."

377. (D) *We homeless ones*. "... we delight in all who, like us, love danger, war, adventure, who do not allow themselves to compromise, to be caught, placated, gelded; we count ourselves among the conquerors, we reflect on the necessity of new orders, even of a new slavery – for every strengthening and elevation of the type 'human being' also includes a new kind of enslavement."

382. (D) *The great health*. "A different ideal runs ahead of us, an odd, seductive, perilous ideal which we would not like to persuade anyone to follow, because we do not so easily grant anyone *the right to do so*: the ideal of a spirit that plays naively, that is not deliberately but from overflowing fullness and power ... with all that up to now was called holy, good, untouchable, divine ... [but now] would just amount to danger, decline and debasement ... [also] ... when beside all earthly seriousness up to now, beside every sort of solemnity in gesture, word, sound, look, morality and task, it presents itself as their most personified involuntary parody – but with which, nonetheless, perhaps *the great seriousness* first begins ..."

Twilight Of The Idols

1. "The wisest sages of all times have come to the same judgment about life: *it is good for nothing* ... What does that *demonstrate*? What does that *indicate*? In the past one would have said ... The *consensus sapientium* demonstrates the truth. Shall we speak this way today? *May* we do so? Here there must be some *sickness* in any case – that's *our* answer ... one should first take a closer look at them!"

2. (B), (C) "... they themselves, these wisest ones, were somehow in *physiological* agreement, so they took the same negative stance toward life – and *had* to take it. ... value judgments about life, for or against, can in the final analysis never be true; they have value only as symptoms ... try to grasp this astounding *finesse*, *that the value of life cannot be assessed*. Not by the living, since they are parties to the dispute ...

3/4. (D) "I am trying to grasp from what idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation – reason = virtue = happiness – stems, the most bizarre equation that there is ..."

5/6/7. (C) "Dialectic is chosen only as a last resort ... the dialectician lays on his opponent the burden of proving that he is not an idiot."

8/9/10/11/12. (B), (D) Socrates ... discovered a new kind of *agon* ... everywhere, the instincts were in anarchy ... The moralism of the Greek philosophers ... simply means: one must imitate Socrates and produce a permanent *daylight* against the dark desires – the daylight of reason ... every acquiescence to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads *downward* ... What they choose as

a means, as salvation, is itself just another expression of *decadence* – they *alter* its expression, that do not do way with it itself. Socrates was a misunderstanding ... To *have* to fight the instincts – that is the formula for *decadence*. As long as life is *ascending*, happiness is the same as instinct.”

1. (C) “Everything that philosophers have handled, for thousands of years now, has been a conceptual mummy ... they all believe, desperately even, in that which is. But since they fail to get it into their grasp, they look for the reason why it withholds itself from them ... sensations ... trick us about the *true* world.”

2/3. (A), (C) “Insofar as the senses display becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie ... the ‘apparent’ world is the only world; the ‘true’ world is merely *added to it by a lie* ... the extent to which we possess science today is precisely the extent to which we have decided to *accept* the testimony of the senses ... the rest is a miscarriage and not-yet-science – that is metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistemology.”

4. (D) ... the ‘highest concepts,’ that is, the most universal and emptiest concepts ... must be *causa sui* ... That’s where they get their stupendous concept ‘God.’ The last, the thinnest, the emptiest concept is posited as the first, as a cause in itself, as *ens enrealissimum*. To think that humanity has had to take seriously the mental distortions of sickly web-spinners.”

5. (A) Nietzsche sees the problem of error and illusion differently: when “... we are compelled by the prejudices of reason to posit unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, thinghood, being, that we see ourselves, as it were, entangled in error, *forced* into error – so sure are we, on the basis of a rigorous self-examination, that it is here that the error lies.” After an interesting analysis of language, reason, being and a conception of the self, he concludes “I’m afraid we’re not rid of God because we still believe in grammar.”

6. (A), (C) First proposition: the illusion and deception in everyday sense experience is not a reason to take our sensory world as merely apparent, but is a reason to take it to be reality (as reality is illusory and deceptive). Second proposition: The typical properties of the ‘real’ world are its permanence and solidity, but these are fictions, or properties of nothing at all. This is a moral-optical illusion. Third proposition: our positive talk of this other world is a sign of our wish to take revenge on this world. Fourth proposition: dualism is a sign of decadence. Artists prize appearance over reality: they say yes to everything questionable and terrible itself.

How the “true world” finally became a fiction: (1) embodied truth, (2) truth in heaven, (3) truth as a thing in itself (understood only by reason), (4) positivism (we have experience; so give up the rest as nonsense), (5) cheerful (the other is forgotten, we are free), (6) give up the dualism so give up both.

Nietzsche Questions: (in each of the following questions, be sure to include at least 10 Nietzsche quotes – from the appropriate letter - in order to textually support your answer.)

(A) This concerns Nietzsche's worldview. I choose the word "worldview" carefully, because Nietzsche certainly believes many things about himself and the world, but at the same time he is critical of "truths" and "reality." Outline an overall picture of Nietzsche's worldview, in terms of the truths he accepts about the world (please omit any element that you would include in your answer to (B).)

(B) This concerns the perhaps the most crucial part of Nietzsche's worldview, it is what we would call philosophy of mind. Outline Nietzsche's view of what is a human being.

(C) Why is Nietzsche a skeptic with regard to realism? To answer this you will have to develop Nietzsche's view on appearance/experience. Also, please address the issue of how Nietzsche can develop a worldview – as in (A) and (B) - without contradicting himself. The tension in this answer is expressed by Nietzsche with his question: "Can truth tolerate embodiment?"

At this point, answer the two questions on the Hegel handout and then compare and contrast this Hegelian view with Nietzsche's view.

(D) This concerns Nietzsche's ethics. The notions of creation and assessment are important in understanding how Nietzsche develops a view of what human beings "should" do. Outline this "prescription" while also including the ways in which we can stray from the path.